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Reciprocal determination and the unity 
of distinct determinations 
in The Primal Structure of Emanuele Severino
The concept of “reciprocal determination” is constituted by two moments: “known-
through-itself” and “known-not-through-something-else” that are referred to Being and
give rise to two judgements in which these two terms are assumed as subject and predicate.
These judgments are reciprocal and complementary and show the unity that substantiate
them, which is interpreted as a synthesis, so that the identity of distinct determinations
counts as identification: duality is not abolished in it. On the contrary, if one claims that a
term is essential to the other, as with reciprocal determination, one must acknowledge that
the latter constitutes the former, so that each one is in itself the other: each term is its self-
contradicting. To prevent this conclusion, one must acknowledge that the pretended co-es-
sentiality is only apparent and the identity of the distinct determinations is not authentic, for
duality has not really been resolved in unity.
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Linguistic Foreword
In this article we refer to the second edition of “La Struttura Originaria”
(“The Primal Structure”) for the original Italian text which was published
in 1981. Translations are ours since this work has not been translated into
English. We have benefited from the only English translation to date of
one of Severino’s works, though the language and concepts used in “The
Primal Structure” are different: Severino (2016). Given the absence of
translations, in our translation of some passages we had to take some de-
cisions regarding some specific terms used by Severino and, among the key
expressions that are recurrent in this article, we want to highlight that we
decided to use “known-through-itself ” and “known-not-through-some-
thing-else” to translate “noto per sé” (per se notum) e “noto non per altro”
(notum non per aliud) respectively, following the use adopted in the En-
glish philosophical literature (see Blackburn, 1996, pp. 282-283, and
Schmidt, 1966, p. 244). For the use of terms as “immediate”, “abstract”,
“concrete” we have followed the usage adopted in the Hegelian tradition
(see Hegel, 2010).  Also, we translated with “knowing” the Italian “no-
tizia”, thus “knowing of Being” is our translation for “presenza dell’essere”.
In some (few) cases, we have included in brackets the original Italian term
preceded by “or.” staying for “original”.
1. Introduction
The Primal Structure is the framework Severino constantly refers to for the
most accomplished presentation of the essence of ground. The entire the-
oretical proposal, even though refined and integrated in subsequent works,
relies on it. This structure is characterised by the co-presence of a set of
meanings immediately connected (related) among them, for this reason
the essence of ground is presented as “a complex or a unity of the mani-
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fold” (Severino, 1981², p. 107). Indeed, for Severino Being “cannot be the
simple, but is that semantic complex in which the sameness of identity
with itself consists” (Severino, 1981², p. 34),  and then he adds: “with the
term ‘Being’ we mean a semantic complex or concreteness whose abstract
moments are formal Being and the determination of this formality” (Sev-
erino, 1981², p. 144). 
Thus, due to the essential role played by “connection”, relation be-
comes the very essence of “structure”, so that any determination, if it is
separated from this structure, represents the abstract, whereas the concrete
is the primal synthesis, which places every given in the totality of immedi-
acy. Moreover, Severino has repeatedly re-instated the incontrovertibility
of this structure, for anyone wanting to deny it should presuppose it.
Thus, if that which is primal is a structure and the relation constitutes the
essence of this structure, we must stress that reciprocal determination rep-
resents the essence of any relation, for it expresses the reciprocity among
the terms that constitute it.
The theme of reciprocal determination is examined initially in Chapter
Two of The Primal Structure. Therefore, we think that to fully assess Sev-
erino’s theory it is essential to tackle his arguments supporting the concept
of reciprocal determination. His intention is to legitimise Being as imme-
diate without resorting to a proof that would deny its immediacy.  
In order to legitimise without proving, Severino resorts to that which
we consider a fundamental logical figure of The Primal Structure: the con-
cept of relation. Incidentally, we observe that the very primal structure is the
relation that exists between ground and its negation. In this case, relation
is conceived in the ordinary sense: as a nexus between two extremes, such
that it constitutes a construct, that can be defined as mono-dyadic, since it
amounts to a structured set of elements. On the other hand, with regard to
the immediacy of Being, Severino resorts to a concept of relation that, ac-
cording to us, should not be considered as a construct and, precisely for
this reason, we believe that this argument is of paramount theoretical rel-
evance.
To be theoretically assessed, Severino’s argument must be analysed with
reference to the concept of “relation”. We need to investigate whether,
speaking of the unification of distinct determinations, relation, interpret-
ed as a construct, can be maintained, or whether, instead, aiming at attain-
ing an authentic unity, the construct must be lifted (i.e., abolished, sublat-
ed), because it is still based upon the duality.  
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2. The immediacy of Being
As we have said, the second chapter of The Primal Structure is devoted to
the immediacy of Being (a detailed introduction to these themes can be
found in Goggi, 2015, pp. 60-66; Cusano, 2011, pp. 103-21; Stella, 2018,
pp. 109-178), which had only been anticipated in the first chapter. Severi-
no introduces his argument with these words: 
The immediately present Being – the “immediate”, as that which
constitutes the subject of the primal judgment […] – is that which
to be affirmed does not require or does not presuppose other than
the presence of itself, or it does not presuppose other than itself as
present: the per se notum (Severino, 1981², p. 144).
Being is the primal, the ground, and can count as something immedi-
ate because the other is not other than it, but other in it. Now this other
are the determinations of Being: “The term “Being” indicates a synthesis -
which will have to be thoroughly examined – between the meaning “Be-
ing” (formal Being) and the meanings that are constituted by the determi-
nations which indeed are” (Severino, 1981², p. 144). This remark is of ut-
most importance, for first of all it allows us understanding the value of Be-
ing’s openness, that is, of its being an intrinsic relation (synthesis); second-
ly, for it reminds us that we are moving from the point of view of Being’s
“affirmation”, which considers Being as the subject of the “primal judge-
ment”, i.e., a meaning that is in relation to other meanings, which are, in-
deed, its “determinations”. 
More precisely, Being is open because the relation that constitutes it is
the same relation that opens it to the difference, since the latter is included
in Being. Thus, in this sentence Severino explains in which sense the
ground, i.e., Being, is a moment of itself: it is so precisely because it posits
itself as a synthesis, which is constituted by Being, intended as a meaning
that indicates only immediate presence, i.e., formal Being, and the mani-
fold meanings, which equally are and constitute those determinations in
which formal Being specifies itself, ceasing to be only formal.
Towards the end of the previous chapter, Severino had clarified the
sense of the “primal meaning”, which expresses “self-meaning” (or. autosig-
nificazione). He had affirmed that
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Outside the primal structure we end up in meaninglessness. Thus,
it is only because we are already placed in the primal openness of
meaning, that the question on meaning receives a meaning; but at
the same time that it receives a meaning, it disappears as a question
because of the primal answer. That is, questioning is authentic (=it
becomes meaningful) with the act of answering it. […] Put differ-
ently: there is nothing meaningless simpliciter; all that is, it is, in its
own way, meaningful (Severino, 1981², p. 132).
In a footnote he had added: “the primal meaning makes meaningful
the request of meaning” (Severino, 1981², p. 140) and this allows to un-
derstand the identity of Being, ground and primal meaning.   
Being, as primal meaning, is the ground not only of its “primal self-
meaning” (Severino, 1981², p. 139) (or. autosignificazione originaria), but
also of all determinations that constitute “meanings”. As a moment in re-
lation with determinations, it counts as formal Being; as a synthesis that
embraces also itself as a formal moment, it counts as concrete: “with the
term ‘Being’ we mean a semantic complex or concreteness whose abstract
moments are formal Being and the determination of this formality” (Sev-
erino, 1981², p. 144). Thus, relation, by unifying abstract moments, gives
rise to semantic concreteness, but also allows detecting a presence, which is
the very manifestation of Being. 
Relation to truth is now expressed as a relation to Being. Truth is such
if, and only if, it is comprehended; so Being is such if, and only if, it is im-
mediately present. This presence or manifestation of Being “is precisely the
sentence: “Being is” (Severino, 1981², p. 143), so that relation to Being is
tantamount to its affirmation. What is the condition – Severino asks – that
allows to affirm Being? The condition is that it manifest its own presence,
which coincides with knowing (or. notizia) itself of Being, that is, knowing
that it is. Knowing of Being depends only on Being (it is a function of Be-
ing only) and this is the reason why Being is per se notum.  This being per
se notum constitutes the “phenomenological Immediacy”, that Severino
calls “F-immediacy”. Now if by principium cognitionis we mean that by
which we affirm that Being is, we can say therefore that the ground of the
affirmation of Being is the very same affirmation of Being. 
Thus, immediately and primally “it is known” (Severino, 1981², p.
144) that Being is and this knowing is realised in the affirmation “Being
is”. Here Severino introduces an important distinction: he notices that in
the affirmation “Being is” the immediate connection between the subject
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and predicate of the proposition is posited; in the proposition “it is known
by itself that Being is”, instead, “the immediacy of knowing (presence, po-
sition) of this connection” (Severino, 1981², p. 144) is stressed. The first
immediate connection, between subject and predicate, is the logical im-
mediacy or “L-immediacy”: “The immediacy of that connection is indeed
the immediacy of identity or non-contradictoriness of Being (logical imme-
diacy)” (Severino, 1981², p. 145). The second immediacy, that of know-
ing, is – as we said – phenomenological immediacy. 
Severino’s focus now will be on the phenomenological immediacy, but
starting from a further consideration which we consider extremely rele-
vant: the difference between ground in itself (Being in itself ) and the
ground as known or posited. Why does Severino start from this theme to
examine phenomenological immediacy? Because, only starting from the
intrinsic relation to the ground (Being), i.e., constitutive of the ground,
one can understand the relation which posits the presence of Being as well
as knowing this presence.
3. Reciprocal determination
With regard to the connection between Being and knowing (i.e., presence;
or. notizia) of Being, Severino says that this knowing must be known, i.e.,
posited. In order to be posited, ground too must be known, i.e., posited,
in other words, the status must be overcome by which “ground is only in
itself: is not posited: is not known” (Severino, 1981², p. 146). Indeed
To the extent that we confine ourselves to the moment of inseity or
implicitness of ground, affirming that Being is cannot emerge (i.e.,
cannot show its validity) and thus lets that negation of Being be: it
cannot lift it. This means that if ground is (simply) the ground, it
is not the ground (Severino, 1981², p. 146).
Until when Being does not show itself, does not show its presence, does
not manifest itself and remain in itself, its negation cannot be lifted (i.e.,
removed). To really lift this negation, Being must manifest itself: “The op-
posite, the negation of Being […], is lifted only to the extent that one
grasps, one posits that Being is immediately present” (Severino, 1981², p.
147). This means that the immediate fundamental connection is that ex-
isting between Being and knowing: only if it is known that Being is imme-
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diately present – and knowing this is tantamount to grasping it – the nega-
tion of Being corresponds to negating its own ground, that is, negating it-
self. 
In synthesis, immediacy is tantamount to self-grounding Being, but “it
is ground only because it is shown, or posited as immediacy” (Severino,
1981², p. 147), i.e., only insofar as it is known. Yet Severino makes more
precise the sense of this immediacy and writes: 
As immediate presence we mean known or affirmed Being through
itself, on the ground of itself. Saying that Being is known through
itself means excluding that it may be known through something
else. That Being is, on the one hand is known through itself because
it is not known through something else; on the other hand, it is not
known through something else because it is known through itself.
Reciprocal determination (Severino, 1981², p. 148).   
Now, the concept of reciprocal determination is that which explains the
concept of immediacy: therefrom its importance. Severino reminds that
immediacy cannot be proved: indeed, if it were to be proved it would not
be immediacy, for that which is proved is mediated (see Severino, 1981²,
p. 143). Thus, reciprocal determination explains immediacy without proving
it. [We can notice that Fichte, 1794, had already observed, with regard to
the ground or first principle of science, that “this can be neither proved nor
defined, if it is to be an absolutely primary principle” (p. 93). Severino
shares the unprovability or immediacy of the principle, but not its indeter-
minable nature]. Then, how to comprehend it? In the case of the knowing
of Being, we know that Being is known through itself because it is not
known through something else and is not known through something else
because it is known through itself.  
Severino wants to show that reciprocal determination is not a (process
of ) grounding and, precisely for this reason, this is not a vicious circle. If
it were a grounding then there should have been a “logical antecedence”
(Severino, 1981², p. 149) of one of the two terms with respect to the other,
which instead does not occur, and this does not occur precisely due to its
being a reciprocal determination. Only if the two terms constituting the
reciprocal determination are taken separately, and thus abstractly, they are
not grasped in what they are, that is the one is not seen “as belonging to
the essence of the other” (Severino, 1981², p. 149).
Thus, reciprocal determinateness is the co-essentiality of the two terms,
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that is their necessary relation or also “the immediate relation of distinct de-
terminations, through which each of the two cannot be without the other”
(Severino, 1981², p. 150). In order further to clarify this point, Severino
writes: “For each of the two distinct determinations the other is not a log-
ical antecedence (thus the consequent needs a grounding), but is, in fact,
an immediately related term; so that neither is something immediate, but
the two constitute the structure of immediacy” (Severino, 1981², p. 150).
Here, even though the chapter is devoted to phenomenological immedia-
cy, Severino is speaking of logical immediacy. We must stress the following
point: reciprocal determination does not amount to the mediation of one
term through the other, for the one is immediate relation to the other: thus,
the middle is excluded from the co-essentiality of the terms.   
For these reasons, Severino claims that we do not end up in a vicious
circle. It would be a vicious circle, if one of the two terms would have been
a ground of the other: if “A” were grounded on “B” and “B” on “A”, then
we would have a vicious circle, for none of the two could accomplish its
task, since the one is posited by means of the other. Thus, it is not a ground
but a reciprocal referring of two terms, which are the one co-essential to
the other and precisely for this reason both constitute the immediate. This
means: immediacy must be understood in relational terms, for the imme-
diate is a concrete structure constituted by two distinct moments, which,
if taken in isolation, are abstract, but if taken one as the essence of the oth-
er, then they express the concrete value of the immediate or the immediacy
of the concrete structure.
To show how a reciprocal determination exists between “known-
through-itself ” (or. noto per sé) and “known-not-through-something-else”
(or. noto non per altro), i.e., a necessary relation which establishes the im-
mediacy of Being in the sense of its being immediately known, thus writes
Severino: 
If we had only the first side of this reciprocity, the term: “known-
not-through-something-else” would be independent from the term:
“known-through-itself ” […]. And vice versa, if we had only the sec-
ond side of this reciprocity, the term: “known-through-itself ”
would be independent from the term: “known-not-through-some-
thing-else” (Severino, 1981², p. 148). 
The two sides are not independent and Severino defends their recipro-
cal dependence. 
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Since Severino’s argument is based on the relation occurring between
the two relata (“known-through-itself ” and “known-not-through-some-
thing-else”), it becomes inescapable at this point to reflect on the way in
which relation is theoretically understood, given that its comprehension
has dramatic implications on the way in which relata and their referring are
understood.
4. Relation and primal identiy
The following point should be investigated: in each relation, understood
as a mono-dyadic construct, both are given: the moment of the reciprocity
of terms and the moment of their difference. As to the first aspect, we say
that relata are relatively dependent; as to the second, we say that they are rel-
atively independent. Neither dependence nor independence can be abso-
lute.
If dependence were absolute, and not relative, then one term would be
reduced to the other and will be con-fused with the other. In this manner,
the difference would disappear which is essential to the existence of a rela-
tion. On the other hand, should the independence be absolute, and not
relative, the terms would no longer be in relation, i.e., relata, but they
would be autonomous and self-sufficient entities. However, any determi-
nate identity cannot posit itself unless it differs from its difference (i.e., it
must be different from that which is different from it), due to the limit
that intrinsically characterises it, so that independence cannot be absolute.
Reciprocal determination, constituting the essence of immediacy,
stresses one aspect of relation, but cannot remove the other: there must be
a certain difference between the terms, otherwise relation itself would
cease. But Severino wants to stress the following point: this difference,
which posits the distinction between terms, is subsumed under the same-
ness of their being. In fact, he maintains: 
Indeed, the two sides of reciprocity are constituted by two analyti-
cal judgements (identical), in which the predicate is attributed to
the subject based on a simple analysis of the predicate, i.e., it is im-
mediately attributed. These judgements can be formulated in this
way: “Known-through-itself (subject) is that which is determined by
known-not-through-something-else (predicate)”: “known-not-
through-something-else is that which is determined by known-
through-itself” (Severino, 1981², p. 148).
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The two judgments are reciprocal and complementary, so that, accord-
ing to Severino, they cannot but be taken together. If taken together they
reveal the unity that constitutes them and their sameness. This points to
an identity that differs from formal identity. The latter posits that the iden-
tical is closed and separated from that which is different, without realising
the necessity of referring (to other). The identity presented by Severino is
open, relational and emerges as a structure. [The theme of identity in Sev-
erino has been tackled by Vitiello (2003) and it has been the subject of a
debate between Severino and Vitiello (2018)]. And soon after, to clarify
that identity of entities is a principle only as a moment of the primal struc-
ture that allows the identity to posit itself as such, Severino adds that
“‘principle’ and ‘explanation’  are not the identity (even if understood as
identity of entities), but the structure within which the identity is primally
structured” (p. 14). If it is expressed via a judgement, it cannot be reduced
to the identity of the subject with the predicate, but must be integrated by
the complementary and reciprocal judgement, which affirms the identity
of predicate and subject. Furthermore, one must add also the judgment
that affirms the identity of the two preceding judgments. Translated into
formulas, we would have (S = p) = (p = S).   
Thus Severino writes in the Introduction: “Saying is not the synthesis
of subject and predicate […], but the identity of the relation of the ‘sub-
ject’ to the ‘predicate’ and the relation of the ‘predicate’ to the ‘subject’”
(Severino, 1981², p. 29). Now, 
This identity between the relation of the “subject” to the “predi-
cate” and the relation of the “predicate” to the “subject” is expressed
by the equation A (=B) = B (=A) which can be expressed also in the
form (A = B) = (B = A). In this expression, the signs of “equality”
which link these two equations between parentheses have a sense
that differs from those signs of equality that constitute the two
equations. It is the primal identity and, outside of it, the identifica-
tion of A to B (A = B) and of B to A (B = A) is the contradictory af-
firmation of the identity of those determinations which are not
identical (A = B). If the two equations constituting it are isolated
from the primal identity (A = B) = (B = A), they are contradictory
(Severino, 1981², pp. 29-30).  
Therefore, the primal identity is that which grounds the two identifica-
tions, which, if isolated from the primal identity would be mere contradic-
tions, because they would affirm that two different determinations would
61 e&c volume 2 • issue 3 • Dec. 2020
be identical. If they are included in the primal identity, instead, they would
reveal that each determination is posited by virtue of its relation to another
determination, so that reciprocity reveals the fundamental feature of that
which is determined. And reciprocity indicates the co-essentiality of deter-
minations, that is their being each one by virtue of the other. Analysing the
reciprocal determination, we have thus touched the theme of the identity
of different determinations, or the unity that includes all determinations.
This unity is Being itself, and reciprocal determination shows its immedi-
acy.   
By translating this argument in terms of “known-through-itself ” and
“known-not-through-something-else”, Severino maintains that it is the re-
ciprocal determination that posits its terms:
This means the each of them is what it is because they are placed in
this determination or reciprocal determination. And thus, only in
this relation the “known-through-itself ” is distinct from the
“known-not-through-something-else”. Or also: that which is deter-
mined by “known-not-through-something-else” and that which is
determined by “known-through-itself ” – the “that which” that ap-
pears in the predicates of the two judgements – counts as “known-
through-itself ” and “known-not-through-something-else” respec-
tively, only because they are so determined (Severino, 1981², p.
149).
However, the fundamental question concerns the primacy of this iden-
tity that counts as a relation or of that Being that counts as synthesis. In
the case of reciprocal relation, its primacy is even more debatable: in which
sense is the relation primal with respect to its relata, if it is posited only
thanks to the latter? One could say that reciprocal relation does not hold
only among its relata, but also between the relation and its relata. And just
like, in the reciprocal determination, there is no logical antecedence
among relata, so this cannot occur between the relation and its relata, so
that a relation cannot claim priority with respect to them. [In this article
we refer to the Hegelian distinction between “external relation” (äusser-
liche Beziehung), which is found in Hegel (2012, p. 47; in the English
translation it is translated as “external connection”, Hegel, 2010, p. 32),
and “immanent synthesis” (immanente Synthesis), which is found in
Hegel (2012, p. 100; 2010, p. 72) and to the aporia of the relation as high-
lighted by Bradley (1897), according to whom relations must be thought
as an intrinsic and an integral constituent of the given (i.e., determina-
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tion). The current debate in analytical philosophy concerning relational
and non-relational properties, as synthesised in Marshall (2018), is extrin-
sic to the theoretical perspective with which we are tackling the problem
of relation in this article]. If it is true that “known-through-itself ” and
“known-not-through-something-else” are determined as such only within
the relation, but it is equally true that relation is determined as such only
by virtue of its terms. 
The impossibility for the relation to emerge beyond its terms concerns
also the primal identity. By declaring it primal, one would like to posit it
at a level that is different from that of the identifications that characterise
the determinations of Being. However, it is precisely the fact that it counts
as determinate identity that impedes it. Indeed, it is determined because it
unifies the terms, so that it cannot be considered as primal with respect to
them: determinate identity is a relation, the identity relation; on the other
hand, relation, if considered as a nexus, has no priority on the relata.
Nonetheless, one might maintain that that which counts as primal, prima-
ry, is the relation as a construct: as a mono-dyadic construct.
In this case, which is Severino’s thesis, when he speaks of the primal
structure, one could ask if terms have or not an identity within the relation.
We have seen that the answer could be that which stresses that they have a
relative identity, that is one is posited by virtue of the other. However, if
so, what we have anticipated above would apply: each term is posited be-
cause it is related to the other, and in this way that difference ceases which
is a condition to have a relation. 
Each term, indeed, positing itself by referring itself to another ends up
losing its own identity, in a strong sense, that is, as such as to posit it as dif-
ferent from any other term, and it is reduced to the act of self-referring,
which is the same for both terms of the relation. This is the reason why when
relation is meant as a construct, it disappears as such because there is no
nexus when the identity of relata disappears. If, on the other hand, one
would claim that terms have their own absolute identity, i.e., each one is
posited independently from the other, relation itself would be eo ipso de-
nied, for both identities, because of their absoluteness, would posit them-
selves by denying any relation to other.    
In fact, if identity were really primal, why would it be constructed
through the “bricks” of difference? We think that the need for an primal
identity is unescapable, for reciprocity, being only horizontal (placed
among terms), is insufficient: a ground of the universe of determination is
necessary which emerges vertically over this order. This means that what is
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primal cannot stay on the same plan with and be reciprocal to that which
it legitimises, for, if so, it would be conditioned by that which is condi-
tioned by it, and thus, it would cease to be primal and unconditioned.   
However, for the primal (i.e., the ground) to count as true, it cannot be
determined. If it is determined, it falls back into the level of reciprocity,
that posits that which grounds in a reciprocal relation with that which is
grounded, so that the former is grounded (determined) by the latter. Sev-
erino had previously affirmed that this status was contradictory: “indeed it
is contradictory that one of the two moments of the reciprocal determina-
tion be at the same time determined by other and determining it” (Severi-
no, 1981², p. 149), but then by attributing a determinateness to the
ground, reduces the grounding to a reciprocal determination, so that the
primacy of the ground is necessarily lost.  
5. Reciprocal determination and unity
The theme of reciprocal determination is investigated also in the third
chapter. We remind that reciprocal determination cannot be understood
as a grounding, that is, as a logical antecedence since neither moment can
ground the other, for it is not capable of grounding itself. It must be
thought as the co-essentiality of the moments of the primal structure.
Now, co-essentiality emerges as such if it is understood without reduc-
ing it to discursivity, which leaves the distinct determinations one out of
other. On the contrary,  
Position of F-immediacy and position of fL-immediacy [where the
expression “fL-immediacy” indicates “L-immediacy, taken in its
simple formal value” (Severino, 1981², p. 204)] count as co-primal,
or as structuring of the primal. Because of this co-primality, none of
the two positions must be assigned to the other in a moment that
is logically distinct or further than that in which these positions are
realised. Their coming-together [or. convenire] is primal, immedi-
ate (Severino, 1981², p. 206).  
The synthesis of the two forms of immediacy cannot be interpreted,
therefore, as something “further with respect to their positing themselves”
(Severino, 1981², p. 206), for 
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the position of these two immediacies constitute an primal synthe-
sis; moments of this synthesis are not something that should be
grounded: precisely because they are already (primally, immediate-
ly) in that synthesis, which if it came after (with respect to the mo-
ments in which the terms of the synthesis are posited) would deter-
mine instead the grounding of the moments that are presupposed
to the synthesis (Severino, 1981², p. 206).
The two moments, which in the second chapter had been defined as
co-essential, are defined here as co-essential: these are two expressions that
indicate the same concept, that is the impossibility that one of the two mo-
ments could be independently from the other. We add that here Severino
provides a definition of the “concrete concept of the abstract”: “This syn-
thesis is the concrete concept of the abstract – where the abstract is consti-
tuted indeed by the two positions of the immediacy” (Severino, 1981², pp.
206-207). The distinction between the “form of non-contradictoriness”
and “the content of this form”, however, remains and constitutes the “con-
crete concept of distinct determinations” (Severino, 1981², p. 207), be-
cause “the primacy of the synthesis does not deny the distinction” (Severi-
no, 1981², p. 207) between the two indicated moments. 
Nonetheless, distinction does not mean irrelativity: “But distinct deter-
minations are not irrelated determinations: when distinction is under-
stood as irrelativity, one has moved from the concrete concept of the ab-
stract to the abstract concept of it” (Severino, 1981², p. 207). The passage
from the abstract concept to the concrete concept of the abstract happens
when the irrelativity of the two terms is overcome and they are thought as
intrinsically connected. Indeed, the two distinct determinations are such
that the one comes immediately together with the other: “The distinct de-
termination is indeed precisely that which is co-primal to the other distinct
determination, and for this it comes immediately together with the other”
(Severino, 1981², p. 207).
“Reciprocal determination” – this must be stressed – should not be un-
derstood as something that as such could exist among moments that are
initially unrelated (and may continue to be so), but as that which indicates
the co-essentiality of the two moments, as it had been indicated in the sec-
ond chapter:
Now, only the abstract moments of reciprocity, abstractly conceived,
i.e., when one is not seen as belonging to the essence of the other,
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can be determined in this sense, so as to have their ground in the
other of the two, understood as a logical antecedence (Severino,
1981², p. 149).   
However, we would like to focus readers’ attention on the very concept
of co-essentiality, on which we started to reflect analysing the second chap-
ter. If the first moment is co-essential to the second, and vice versa, we
think that we cannot even posit the distinction between the moments. In-
deed, distinction implies the identity of each distinct determination,
which must show a relative independence from that of the other distinct de-
termination. But if the first distinct determination finds its own essence in
the other, how could it exhibit some independence from the latter? If the
latter is the essence of the former, how could the duality of the former and
the latter be maintained?
We think that the co-essentiality of the distinct determinations cannot
but end up in their substantial unity, in the sense that, each determination
is the act of self-referring to the other, so that they result in this act, which
is unique and the same for both. Furthermore, this allows to overcome the
concept of relation understood as a mono-dyadic construct, to reach the
concept that understands relation as the act of self-referring of each term
(relatum), i.e., that act in which differences among relata disappear.  
Indeed, we think that this is only way to understand the identity of dis-
tinct determinations. To clarify this fundamental concept, let us go back to
the second chapter, when Severino speaks of the co-primality of the posi-
tion of Being and the immediacy of this position. If by P1 we indicate the
position of Being and by P2 the position of the its immediacy, then “the
abstract consideration of the two positions implies that the primal posi-
tional whole (=I) be such that I = P1 + P2 (where P1 counts as the positional
positivity that is not included in the positional positivity constituted by P2
and vice versa)” (Severino, 1981², p. 162).
Thus, in the abstract consideration of the two positions, the whole
counts as their sum. However, this is not the concrete consideration, ac-
cording to which, instead, “I = P2” (Severino, 1981², p. 162). From this
formula, we deduce that P1 is not logically antecedent with respect to P2,
“but the co-primality of P1 and P2 lifts, denies P1 as antecedent” (Severino,
1981², p. 163). And this is the conclusion: “ P2 grounds P1, not because I
= P1 + P2; but because I = P2, that is because P2 includes P1, or it is the
whole of which P1 […] is a moment” (Severino, 1981², p. 163). Moreover: 
If P1 includes P2 […], P2 in its turn, and in its own way, includes P1
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[…] and includes it as itself including, in its own way, P2. If then
P1 and P2 are assumed concretely we obtain P1 = P2, and the differ-
ence of indices only points to the twofold aspect of the concrete
sameness: twofold aspect represented by the different sense of the in-
clusion of P1 in P2 and of P2 in P1. In this sense the ground is P1 =
P2, or the concrete unity of distinct determinations (Severino,
1981², p. 163).
Speaking of “unity of distinct determinations” is, according to us, a step
forward with respect to the thesis of their co-primality (co-essentiality).
However, unity is not effectively posited, for unification is maintained. In
fact, Severino speaks of reciprocal inclusion of moments of the primal and
the same concept is used to refer to the primal judgement and, in this man-
ner, duality is maintained anyway. He does not attain the lifting (removal)
of duality, which only could amount to establish authentic unity, and this
is so because to the disappearance of duality would correspond the disap-
pearance of the determinateness of unity.    
In the case of the primal judgment, he affirms that this judgment “must
not be affirmed by saying that Being is that which is immediate, but by
saying that that which is immediate is immediate. […] The subject has
here itself as a predicate or the primal judgment is, in this formulation, an
analytical proposition” (Severino, 1981², p. 171). Now, this is the point
where Severino comes closer to the concept of the duality that converges in-
to unity (i.e., the two that become one). 
This is further confirmed by what he writes with regard to the propo-
sition “Being is Being” (Severino, 1981², p. 180). As we have already
shown, it is the abstract-intellect that “presupposes the terms to their rela-
tion – relation that, in this case, is the identity of that which, thus, is not
two, but one” (Severino, 1981², p. 180).
By going beyond the perspective of the abstract-intellect we discover
the primal value of the identity of Being with itself, which Severino himself
defines as “absolute” (Severino, 1981², p. 181). The point is this: on the
one hand, a real unity is requested, for only it has an primal (i.e., concrete)
value. On the other hand, however, this unity is expressed by formulas
which even though would like to express the identity of identity with itself
(or unity of unity with itself ), still reproduce the distinction within the
identity (unity): “Distinction is in fact the very same articulation of iden-
tity” (Severino, 1981², p. 181). And also: “Identity is certainly identity of
a difference” (Severino, 1981², p. 189).
67 e&c volume 2 • issue 3 • Dec. 2020
However, the only difference that, in the end, can be found as “imma-
nent to identity is the same difference between the abstract moment and
the whole” (Severino, 1981², p. 189). This concept is then stressed: “Dis-
tinction implied by the proposition: ‘Being is Being’, is distinction be-
tween abstract and concrete, and not – as it would follow from the aporetic
discourse – between Being and Being, both understood as abstract mo-
ments” (Severino, 1981², pp. 192-193). 
How the abstract is interpreted is clear: it is the irrelativity of moments.
That which is concrete is instead their unity, but this unity or identity is
also defined as “immediate connection”, and we think that these two con-
cepts differ, since unity, according to us, should transcend relation and,
thus, connection.   
Moreover, we can ask: between the abstract and the concrete is there a
distinction? We think that the distinction should pertain to the abstract
consideration of the abstract; on the contrary, the concrete consideration
grasps the lifting of the abstract in the concrete, and the issue lies entirely
in the way in which this lifting (removal) must be understood. If the lifting
leaves space for the unity only, without the distinction, then one necessar-
ily emerges over the determinateness (any form of determinateness) and one
grasps the effective concreteness. If, instead, the distinction is preserved,
then the determinateness remains, but this implies that the abstract has
not been truly lifted (removed). 
6. Conclusion 
Unification reproduces the relational construct which had to be overcome
due to its being unintelligible, so that also reciprocal determination, thus
interpreted, falls back into the ordinary concept of relation. The latter re-
produces the vicious circle of the infinite regress of one term to the other,
as if the insufficiency of one could be overcome by the insufficiency of the
other. 
The path followed by Severino is not that of interpreting relation as an
act and determinations in their lifting in the unity of the act that grounds
them by transcending them, but that of preserving relation in the form of
the circle of presupposition, which undoubtedly has a formal advantage
consisting in preserving the determinateness of the terms that refer to each
other and of their synthesis.   
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We claim that one should have distinguished the level on which we
place ourselves to argue (i.e., the formal universe of discourse), which in-
evitably has to resort to that which is determinate (i.e., level of that which
is inevitable), and the level on which the ground is placed which is needed
by the formal universe of discourse (i.e., level of that which is necessary).
Ground is not inevitable, but necessary: it coincides with the uncondi-
tioned condition that grounds the universe of determinations only because
it transcends it, and for this reason it cannot be determined without eo ipso
falling back into that order that is in search for a ground (i.e., that needs
to be grounded).
Severino does not accept a ground that is not determined and seman-
ticised, and thus he does not accept an authentic unity, but he interprets
unity as unification, which is determined by virtue of the determinateness
of the unified determinations. However, in this manner, he ends up deny-
ing the co-essentiality of the unified determinations, which he discussed
analysing the theme of the reciprocal determination, as well as the unity of
distinct determinations, which is treated in various place of The Primal
Structure. By not achieving an authentic unity, he does not achieve an au-
thentic overcoming of the difference (distinction), so that the unity of dis-
tinct determinations is only apparent and the formulas by which it is ex-
pressed clearly show that it can only be posited by virtue of the terms on
which it is based. The identity of subject and predicate too, which is ex-
pressed by the formula “(Sg = Pr) = (Pr = Sg)” (Severino, 1981², p. 285),
witnesses that the difference is still preserved, despite the intention to attain
unity.
To conclude, we can say that, from a certain point of view, Severino in-
tends to lift duality in the unity and, thus, to achieve the authentic unity;
but, from another point of view, he intends to maintain the determinate-
ness and, thus, the relation, which represents a unification, not a unity, be-
cause it relies on the duality of the related terms, by virtue of which it
maintains its determinateness.
Thus, we think that we are in the following alternative: aut one speaks
of co-essentiality, but then, if one term is co-essential to the other, the lat-
ter is co-essential to the former, so that each is in itself the act of self-refer-
ring to the other so that, in the unity of the act, differences among terms
are removed (i.e., are lifted) and thus terms themselves are removed; aut
one intends to maintain the determinateness, but then one can never at-
tain an authentic identity of different (distinct) determinations, which is only
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effective if the multiplicity is resolved in the authentic unity, which cannot
be determinable, counting as ablatio alteritatis.
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